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"Hearts and minds" theory contends development aid strengthens community support for counterinsurgents by providing jobs and public goods. Based on field interviews in Kabul, we develop an alternative theoretical framework emphasizing instead the ideological preferences of civilians. In our model, some aid projects are ideologically contentious while others are benign. Given a mix of foreign aid, each civilian supports either the counterinsurgents or rebels, depending on his/her idiosyncratic preferences. In this setting, greater provisions of aid can actually erode community support. Donors therefore calibrate the mix of foreign aid to appease population groups with relatively strong ideological sensibilities. Individual-level analysis based on unique Afghan data substantiates key features of our theory. Benign projects lead to favorable opinions of development, while contentious aid has the opposite effect. Moreover, favorable opinions of development are associated with stronger support for government and counterinsurgents, and weaker support for rebels.

"Hearts and minds" theory contends development aid strengthens community support for counterinsurgents by providing jobs and public goods. Based on field interviews in Kabul, we develop an alternative theoretical framework emphasizing instead the ideological preferences of civilians. In our model, some aid projects are ideologically contentious while others are benign. Given a mix of foreign aid, each civilian supports either the counterinsurgents or rebels, depending on his/her idiosyncratic preferences. In this setting, greater provisions of aid can actually erode community support. Donors therefore calibrate the mix of foreign aid to appease population groups with relatively strong ideological sensibilities. Individual-level analysis based on unique Afghan data substantiates key features of our theory. Benign projects lead to favorable opinions of development, while contentious aid has the opposite effect. Moreover, favorable opinions of development are associated with stronger support for government and counterinsurgents, and weaker support for rebels.

This note introduces a four-article symposium on stability and reconstruction across Afghanistan. The contributors are experienced practitioners and/or field researchers drawn from a spectrum of the social sciences. Each of them has established a physical presence in Afghanistan for a significant period of time. Consequently, this symposium elucidates some critical aspects of the conflict and development phenomena which have thus far been overlooked. [JEL codes: D74, O53]

Recent work has suggested the foreign-led reconstruction effort carried out in Afghanistan and Iraq can mitigate violence because it helps win the "hearts and minds" of local people. For the case of Afghanistan, we show there is no evidence behind such an assertion. Analyzing unique data on Commander's Emergency Response Program (CERP) spending across the country from 2005 to 2009, we find no discernible effect of the reconstruction effort on violence. In light of the absence of empirical evidence for the success of the CERP, we suggest the hearts and minds credo currently guiding U.S. policy be reconsidered. [D74, H56, O1]

We study the long-run effects of conflict on social attitudes, with World War II in Central and Eastern Europe as our setting. Much of earlier work has relied on self-reported measures of victimization, which are prone to endogenous misreporting. With our own survey-based measure, we replicate established findings linking victimization to political participation, civic engagement, optimism, and trust. Those findings are reversed, however, when tested instead with an objective measure of victimization based on historical reference material. Thus, we urge caution when interpreting survey-based results from this literature as causal.

We study the long-run effects of conflict on social attitudes, with World War II in Central and Eastern Europe as our setting. Much of earlier work has relied on self-reported measures of victimization, which are prone to endogenous misreporting. With our own survey-based measure, we replicate established findings linking victimization to political participation, civic engagement, optimism, and trust. Those findings are reversed, however, when tested instead with an objective measure of victimization based on historical reference material. Thus, we urge caution when interpreting survey-based results from this literature as causal.

We study the long-run effects of con ict on social attitudes, with World War II in Central and Eastern Europe as our setting. Much of earlier work has relied on self- reported measures of victimization, which are prone to endogenous misreporting. With our own survey-based measure, we replicate established findings linking victimization to political participation, civic engagement, optimism, and trust. Those findings are reversed, however, when tested instead with an objective measure of victimization based on historical reference material. Thus, we urge caution when interpreting survey- based results from this literature as causal.

We investigate changes to the ownership and control of East Asia's largest companies in 1996 and 2008. Newly compiled data for 1386 publicly traded companies at the end of 2008 are supplemented with existing data on 1,606 publicly traded companies at the

Previous research on firm performance does not adequately account for the interrelatedness of a firm's professional connections, political ties, and family business-group affiliation. Many widely-cited findings may therefore be subject to confounding bias. To address this problem, we adopt a holistic approach by assembling a new dataset covering professional, political, and family networks for 1,290 large East Asian firms. We find that professional networks buoyed performance during the 2008 financial crisis; political and family networks did not. We provide evidence that information access is a key mechanism underlying the effect of professional networks. A one standard deviation improvement to a firm's professional network position cushioned the fall in quarterly ROA by approximately 35% during the crisis.